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Municipalities throughout the country have adopted nuisance ordinances to recruit 
landlords in assisting with crime control. Nuisance ordinances are municipality-level policies that 
sanction landlords if police are frequently called to respond to a landlord’s tenants. To avoid a fine, 
landlords must abate tenants whose conduct was considered a nuisance under the municipality’s 
ordinance; most often, this abatement process involves evicting the tenant. Little research has 
evaluated the impact of nuisance ordinances on innocent tenants – particularly, female victims of 
domestic violence. Because domestic violence is seldom excluded from the list of nuisance 
activities considered under the ordinances, legal advocates have warned that the threat of eviction 
associated with nuisance ordinances could discourage domestic violence victims from reporting 
their abuse to the police. This thesis contributes the first econometric analysis of the effect of 
nuisance ordinances on domestic violence reporting and incidence. The variation in nuisance 
ordinance enactment across municipalities and over time provides the framework to identify the 
causal effect of nuisance ordinances on domestic violence using a difference-in-differences 
strategy. I find that nuisance ordinance enactment leads to a 16.5-23.2 percent reduction in 
domestic violence-related 911 calls for assistance and a 0.4-0.7 percentage point increase in self-
reported domestic violence incidence in California. Nationwide, I also find nuisance ordinance 
enactment is associated with a statistically significant increase in online search activity related to 
domestic violence as a proxy for domestic violence incidence. These results suggest that nuisance 
ordinances have the unintended consequence of discouraging domestic violence victims from 
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Nearly 20 people are physically abused by an intimate partner in the United States each 
minute (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence). Intimate partner abuse accounts for three 
quarters of all violence against women (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000); most incidents of intimate 
partner abuse occur in the home where women represent 85 percent of domestic violence victims 
(Catalano, 2015; Fais, 2008). Beyond the physical and emotional harm domestic violence victims 
directly suffer, domestic violence also inflicts significant costs on society at-large. Approximately 
4.1 billion dollars in annual medical costs are associated with domestic violence-related injuries 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003). Domestic violence-related injuries 
additionally impair victims’ ability to work, resulting in total annual costs of nearly 0.9 billion 
dollars in lost productivity from paid work outside the home as well as unpaid household chores 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003). Though the prevalence and costs of domestic 
violence are already high, they are likely underestimates as incidents of domestic violence are 
often unreported (Aizer & Dal Bó, 2009; Catalano, 2015; Tauchen & Witte, 1995). 
Nuisance ordinances could pose one barrier to reporting facing domestic violence victims. 
Municipalities throughout the country have adopted nuisance ordinances to recruit landlords in 
assisting with crime control. Nuisance ordinances are municipality-level policies that sanction 
landlords if police are frequently called to respond to a landlord’s tenants (Fais, 2008). To avoid a 
fine, landlords must abate tenants whose conduct was considered a nuisance under the 
municipality’s ordinance; most often, this abatement process involves evicting the 
tenant (Desmond & Valdez, 2012; Greif, 2018). Proponents of nuisance ordinances argue that the 
ordinances improve the efficiency of police resource utilization, protect tenant safety, and deter 
tenants – including resident perpetrators of domestic violence – from engaging in criminal activity 
(Arnold & Slusser, 2015; Desmond & Valdez, 2012; Fais, 2008; Greif, 2018; Thacher, 2008). Yet 
because domestic violence is seldom excluded from the list of nuisance activities considered under 
the ordinances, legal advocates1 have warned that the threat of eviction associated with nuisance 
ordinances could discourage domestic violence victims from reporting their abuse to the police 
(Arnold & Slusser, 2015; Desmond & Valdez, 2012; Fais, 2008). Despite conflicting perspectives 
on the merit of nuisance ordinances as a crime prevention policy, little empirical research has 
                                               
1 e.g. American Civil Liberties Union (“I Am Not a Nuisance”), National Housing Law Project (“Nuisance and Crime-
Free Ordinances Initiative”), Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law (“The Cost of Being ‘Crime Free’”).  
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elucidated the impact of nuisance ordinances on innocent tenants – particularly, female victims of 
domestic violence. 
This paper contributes the first econometric analysis of the effect of nuisance ordinances 
on domestic violence reporting and incidence. It is important to consider not only the impact of 
nuisance ordinances on reported domestic violence, but also on domestic violence incidence 
because nuisance ordinances could plausibly affect the proportion of domestic violence incidents 
reported. I hypothesize that if a nuisance ordinance is enacted in a municipality, then reports of 
domestic violence will decrease because of the potential consequence of eviction that nuisance 
ordinances impose on calling for police services. The expected change in domestic violence 
incidence following ordinance enactment is ambiguous. Nuisance ordinances could discourage 
abusers from perpetrating domestic violence if an abuser fears their actions will be reported; 
regardless of whether criminal charges are pursued, an abuser could still face eviction under a 
nuisance ordinance. Alternatively, domestic violence incidence could remain unchanged or even 
increase if victims are unable to call for help.  
To evaluate this hypothesis, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy comparing 
changes in domestic violence reporting and incidence in municipalities that enacted nuisance 
ordinances relative to those that did not. The identifying assumption necessary to interpret my 
results as causal depends on parallel trends in domestic violence across municipalities; I 
demonstrate my results are robust to the inclusion of county-specific linear trends as well as other 
time-varying control variables to strengthen the validity of the parallel trends assumption. I also 
conduct several event study analyses to confirm my results and further evaluate potential bias from 
differential trends. Due to data availability, my analysis of reported domestic violence is limited 
to California where I use data on domestic violence-related 911 calls for assistance. I also use the 
California Women’s Health Survey as a measure of domestic violence incidence in California, as 
well as data on female mortality from assault from the National Vital Statistics System and Google 
Trends data on online search activity related to domestic violence as additional proxies for 
domestic violence incidence on a national scale. 
My results support the hypothesis that nuisance ordinances cause a decline in reported 
domestic violence, while domestic violence incidence persists. I find that nuisance ordinance 
enactment leads to a 16.5-23.2 percent reduction in domestic violence-related 911 calls for 
assistance and a 0.4-0.7 percentage point increase in self-reported domestic violence incidence in 
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California. Nationwide, I do not find evidence that nuisance ordinance enactment affects domestic 
violence incidence as measured by female mortality from assault. However, this does not 
necessarily imply nuisance ordinances hold no effect over domestic violence incidence 
nationwide. Analyzing the impact of municipality-level nuisance ordinances on county-level 
mortality data introduces measurement error that could bias my results to zero. Furthermore, 
mortality is a severe outcome of domestic violence. I do find nuisance ordinance enactment is 
associated with a statistically significant increase in online search activity related to domestic 
violence, as a less extreme proxy for domestic violence incidence on a national scale. 
My findings contribute to a growing literature on the economics of crime. Most closely 
related is research on nuisance ordinances; however, existing research on nuisance ordinances is 
either focused on the legal or policy background of nuisance ordinances (Cameron, 2012; Fais, 
2008; Gavin, 2014; Kastner, 2015; Mead et al., 2018; Moran-McCabe, Gutman, & Burris, 2018; 
Seiler, 2008), is qualitative in methodology (Arnold, 2019; Arnold & Slusser, 2015; Greif, 2018), 
or is limited to single-city case studies of nuisance ordinances’ effects (Desmond & Valdez, 2012). 
This paper provides the first causal estimates of the impact of nuisance ordinances. More broadly, 
this paper contributes to our understanding of the interactions between police and communities, 
and their implications for criminal activity. Social science research has devoted considerable 
attention to traditional policing efforts (Braga, Welsh, & Schnell, 2015; Kent & Jacobs, 2005); less 
attention has been paid to the rise of third-party policing mechanisms like nuisance ordinances that 
outsource crime control to landlords or other community stakeholders (Kraakman, 1986; 
Mazerolle & Ransley, 2002). Lastly, this paper contributes to the domestic violence literature in 
economics by studying both reported domestic violence as well as domestic violence incidence, 
providing insight into determinants of whether victims report domestic violence and consequences 
of policies that affect reporting (Aizer & Dal Bó, 2009; Card & Dahl, 2011; Carrell & Hoekstra, 
2012; Iyengar, 2009; Markowitz, 2000; Miller & Segal, 2018; Raissian, 2016; Stevenson & 
Wolfers, 2006; Tauchen & Witte, 1995).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on nuisance ordinances, as well as a survey of the existing literature on domestic 
violence reporting to inform potential hypotheses on the relationship between nuisance ordinances 
and domestic violence. Section 3 outlines my empirical strategy used to identify the effect of 
nuisance ordinance enactment on domestic violence reporting and incidence. Section 4 describes 
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my data and presents my results for nuisance ordinances’ effect on domestic violence reporting 
and incidence in California, followed by analyses of nuisance ordinances’ impact on several 
nationwide proxies for domestic violence incidence. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Nuisance Ordinances 
Against a backdrop of “tough on crime” politics, police forces across the country began to 
expand their presence throughout the second half of the twentieth century (Kent & Jacobs, 2005; 
Mazerolle & Ransley, 2002). To accommodate this growth in police services without imposing 
too great a burden on local resources, municipalities enlisted other community stakeholders to 
assist with crime control through third-party policing (Mazerolle & Ransley, 2002). Third-party 
policing describes police efforts to “persuade or coerce third parties, such as landlords, parents, 
local governments and other regulators, and business owners to take some responsibility for 
preventing crime” (Mazerolle & Ransley, 2002, p. 1).  
Nuisance ordinances are a common third-party policing tactic (Desmond & Valdez, 2012). 
Nuisance ordinances are municipality-level policies that sanction landlords if police are frequently 
called to respond to a landlord’s tenants (Fais, 2008). To avoid a fine, landlords must abate tenants 
whose conduct was considered a nuisance under the municipality’s ordinance; most often, this 
abatement process involves evicting the tenant (Desmond & Valdez, 2012; Greif, 2018). Although 
the details of nuisance ordinances vary by municipality, nuisance ordinances share several 
common features. Tenants are regarded as a nuisance when they make a certain number of calls 
for police service within a certain time period (Fais, 2008). Some ordinances maintain a list of 
specific offenses that constitute a nuisance activity; common offenses include battery, assault, 
stalking, sexual violence, weapons violations, drug-related conduct, and general harassment or 
domestic disturbances. Other ordinances are more vague such that the aforementioned nuisance 
activities would be implicitly relevant under the ordinance (Fais, 2008). It is important to note that 
the majority of nuisance ordinances do not distinguish between the offender and victim of a crime, 
so the consequences of abatement are applied to the entire tenant unit (Kanovsky, 2016). 
Furthermore, the majority of nuisance ordinances do not exempt domestic violence incidents from 
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being considered a nuisance; in fact, many nuisance ordinances explicitly include domestic 
violence, assault, sexual abuse, or battery as nuisance activities (Fais, 2008). 
Nuisance ordinances became increasingly common beginning in the 1990s as an effort to 
combat drug dealing. Yet police departments quickly capitalized on nuisance ordinances to 
delegate the policing of tenant behavior to landlords (Desmond & Valdez, 2012; Mazerolle & 
Ransley, 2002; Thacher, 2008). Nuisance ordinances were not the only crime control measures 
outsourced to residential properties during this period. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 
reaffirmed by the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, similarly enabled 
public housing authorities (PHAs) to evict tenants for criminal behavior (Walter, Viglione, & 
Tillyer, 2017). Motivated by high crime rates afflicting public housing, President Clinton signed 
the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 to authorize the “one strike and you’re 
out” initiative (commonly referred to as “One Strike”). One Strike increased the level of discretion 
awarded to PHAs in controlling their public housing populations by allowing PHAs to screen 
applicants for prior criminal activity and evict current tenants for criminal activity – regardless of 
whether the criminal activity occurred on the public housing premises or involved police arrest or 
conviction (Renzetti, 2001; Walter et al., 2017). Given the prevalence of domestic violence in 
public housing (Renzetti, 2001), the threat of eviction under One Strike was particularly salient for 
domestic violence victims. The reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 
2005 ultimately addressed domestic violence victims’ vulnerability to the eviction consequences 
of One Strike by making it unlawful to apply One Strike policies to domestic violence victims in 
subsidized housing. VAWA did not, however, regulate eviction practices of landlords in private, 
non-subsidized housing. Thus, most nuisance ordinances still lack protections for domestic 
violence victims (Fais, 2008). 
Police departments and municipal governments endorse nuisance ordinances as a useful 
incentive tool for holding landlords accountable to their properties while ensuring a secure living 
environment for tenants. Landlords can also benefit from nuisance ordinances because a safer 
residential atmosphere helps maintain their rental rates and minimize damage sustained to their 
property (Fais, 2008; Greif, 2018). Meanwhile, police can focus their attention on higher-priority 
crimes by downgrading certain disorderly conduct to the status of “nuisance” delegated to 
landlords (Desmond & Valdez, 2012). Police departments can also expect a reduction in calls for 
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their services, which further aids in reducing the strain on municipal resources (Fais, 2008; 
Thacher, 2008). 
Despite nuisance ordinances’ alleged objective of promoting public safety, nuisance 
ordinances additionally function as an exclusionary mechanism to deter racial and economic 
integration. This subterfuge manifests in both the intent and enforcement of nuisance ordinances. 
For example, after voting to enact a nuisance ordinance in Bedford, Ohio, a city councilor 
acknowledged the racialized motives driving the ordinance’s passage:  
“We believe in those middle-class values of neighborhoods where 
people can go home and their home is their castle and feel safe…We 
believe in neighborhoods not hoods. We will do everything we can 
to maintain those quality of life issues…That is one of the reasons 
we passed that nuisance law tonight…these are predominantly 
African American kids who bring in that mentality from the inner 
city…We are trying to stop that.” (Beverley Somai v. City of 
Bedford, Ohio: First Amended Complaint, 2019, p. 8)  
Once enacted, nuisance ordinances apply to an entire municipality. Nevertheless, nuisance 
ordinances are especially enforced against racial minorities; landlords of properties in 
predominantly Black communities disproportionately receive abatement directives (Desmond & 
Valdez, 2012). Considering that the expansion of police presence during the second half of the 
twentieth century was particularly concentrated in cities with higher proportions of Black residents 
(Kent & Jacobs, 2005), nuisance ordinances emerged as a tactic to police disadvantaged and 
minority communities (Desmond & Valdez, 2012).   
For tenants, the possible consequences of eviction associated with nuisance ordinances are 
severe. Renters with a court record of eviction often struggle to secure new shelter in the housing 
market. With years-long waiting lists for affordable housing programs, public housing authorities 
must be highly selective in granting assistance; evictions can easily result in a rejected application 
(Desmond, 2012). Because many landlords discriminate against those with eviction histories 
(Greif, 2018; Kleysteuber, 2007), evicted tenants tend to relocate to more disadvantaged 
neighborhoods or even enter a period of homelessness (Desmond, 2012). The consequences of 
eviction are especially dire for domestic violence victims who seldom have access to alternative 
resources (Fais, 2008). In a qualitative study of the impact of St. Louis’s nuisance ordinance on 
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domestic violence survivors, participants expressed that they stopped calling 911 to avoid the 
negative repercussions of eviction (Arnold, 2019). 
Law enforcement officials and domestic violence advocates hold divergent perspectives on 
nuisance ordinances’ effectiveness at protecting tenants experiencing domestic violence. While 
law enforcement officials view nuisance ordinances as a disincentive mechanism to deter abusers 
from perpetrating domestic violence, victim advocates argue nuisance ordinances only exacerbate 
the risks and barriers to safety that domestic violence survivors already face (Arnold & Slusser, 
2015). Law enforcement and advocates also differ on whether to interpret a reduction in calls for 
police services as an indication that domestic violence has decreased or that victims are now averse 
to calling for help in fear of eviction (Arnold & Slusser, 2015). 
Little research, however, has clarified the impact of nuisance ordinances on innocent 
tenants – particularly, victims of domestic violence. Desmond and Valdez (2012) contributed the 
first and only empirical study to evaluate this question. In analyzing every nuisance citation 
distributed in Milwaukee over a two-year period, they found that nearly a third of all citations were 
generated by domestic violence; most landlords abated their “nuisance” with eviction. The authors 
conclude: “The nuisance property ordinance has the effect of forcing abused women to choose 
between calling the police on their abusers (only to risk eviction) or staying in their apartments 
(only to risk more abuse)” (Desmond & Valdez, 2012, p. 137). However, their study was limited 
to the city of Milwaukee. Identifying the causal effect of nuisance ordinances on domestic violence 
reporting and incidence requires a convincing counterfactual.  
 
2.2 Domestic Violence Reporting 
A key policy response to domestic violence is to support victims in reporting their abuse 
and acquiring the help of legal and social services. Prior research has documented that reporting 
domestic violence can serve as an effective deterrent of future abuse (Felson, Ackerman, & 
Gallagher, 2005). In a longitudinal analysis of domestic violence incidents, Felson et al. 
(2005) found that police intervention – regardless of whether an arrest was ultimately made – 
reduced the likelihood that domestic violence would be repeated. Children exposed to domestic 
violence may also benefit from reporting. Because schools are notified once domestic violence is 
reported in a student’s household, school staff can ensure that affected students receive the 
academic and emotional supports they need to succeed (Carrell & Hoekstra, 2012). 
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 Despite the potential benefits of reporting domestic violence, many victims still choose not 
to seek the help of law enforcement and remain with their abusers. Scholars have considered a 
variety of reasons to explain this decision. First, the psychological and emotional aspects 
of domestic violence can make it difficult for a victim to break their commitment to their partner. 
Many domestic violence victims develop feelings of helplessness during an abusive relationship, 
which can cause victims to dismiss reporting mechanisms as futile (Smith, 2000). Even if a victim 
can perceive some benefit in reporting, the power dynamics of the abusive relationship often 
impose guilt on a victim that discourages them from leveraging consequences against their abuser 
(Smith, 2000). Victims may also choose to remain committed to their relationship out of love for 
their partner and hope that their partner will eventually change their abusive behavior (Aizer & 
Dal Bó, 2009; Strube & Barbour, 1984). 
 Second, victims may fear retaliation from their abuser if they report – especially if no legal 
action is taken against the abuser after the report is filed (Singer, 1988). In response to the lack of 
enforcement against domestic violence, some states have passed mandatory arrest laws that require 
police to arrest abusers whenever an incident of domestic violence is reported (Felson et al., 2005; 
Iyengar, 2009; Lyon, 1999; Smith, 2000). Yet evaluations of mandatory arrest laws find the laws 
actually discourage victims from reporting out of fear of retribution from their abuser who may 
return home soon after the arrest and further harm their partner (Iyengar, 2009; Lyon, 1999). In 
fact, Iyengar (2009) found that the decreased likelihood of reporting domestic violence under 
mandatory arrest laws resulted in an increase in intimate partner homicides. Other reasons for not 
reporting abuse or remaining in a violent relationship include financial dependence on a partner, 
distrust in the police, and the extensive time commitment involved in criminal investigations and 
court procedures (Aizer & Dal Bó, 2009; Hamilton & Coates, 1993; Smith, 2000; Strube & 
Barbour, 1984). 
 
2.3 Hypotheses on the Relationship Between Ordinances and Violence 
 There are several ways in which nuisance ordinances could affect domestic violence. 
Becker (1968) theorizes a potential offender weighs the costs and benefits of committing a crime 
before taking action. If the expected utility from committing the crime exceeds the expected utility 
from not committing the crime, then the offender will commit the crime. Under Becker’s theory, 
the threat of eviction associated with nuisance ordinances increases the cost of engaging in 
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nuisance activities penalized in a municipality’s ordinance – including domestic violence crimes. 
Numerous studies have documented that abusers are responsive to policies that change the cost of 
perpetrating domestic violence, lessening their abuse when the costs increase (Markowitz, 2000; 
Raissian, 2016; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2006; Tauchen & Witte, 1995). Thus, one could expect 
domestic violence to decrease in response to the increased costs of perpetrating domestic violence 
that nuisance ordinances impose. 
 However, nuisance ordinances also make it costlier for domestic violence victims to report 
their abuse to the police. Most ordinances do not distinguish between perpetrating acts of domestic 
violence and being the victim of such violence when identifying “nuisance” conduct (Kanovsky, 
2016). In this way, abusers are not the only actors influenced by nuisance ordinances; victims, too, 
must weigh the costs and benefits of reporting their abuse. In addition to the barriers to reporting 
facing domestic violence victims as outlined in Section 2.2, nuisance ordinances could similarly 
deter victims from calling the police because they may incur the potential cost of eviction alongside 
their abuser. Consequently, domestic violence incidence could increase if victims cannot access 
police services. 
 Since nuisance ordinances can plausibly impact abusers’ likelihood of perpetrating 
domestic violence as well as victims’ likelihood of reporting their abuse, it is important to analyze 
the effect of nuisance ordinances on both reported domestic violence and the underlying 
occurrence of domestic violence. Drawing conclusions about the effect of nuisance ordinances on 
domestic violence from changes in domestic violence reporting alone fails to consider how much 
of the change is due to an actual change in domestic violence incidence and if any of the change 
is due to a change in the probability domestic violence is reported. I hypothesize that if a nuisance 
ordinance is enacted in a municipality, then reports of domestic violence will decrease, while 
domestic violence incidence will not decrease and may even increase if victims are unable to call 
for help.  
 
3 Empirical Strategy 
Leveraging the variation in nuisance ordinance enactment across municipalities and over 
time, I specify a difference-in-differences (DD) model comparing domestic violence before and 
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after a nuisance ordinance is enacted in municipalities with a nuisance ordinance relative to 
municipalities without a nuisance ordinance: 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒-. = 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒-. + 𝛼- + 𝛾. + 𝜀-. 
where 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒-. is a measure of domestic violence reporting or incidence in 
municipality 𝑖 at year 𝑡, and 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒-. is an indicator that the measure of domestic 
violence was recorded after a nuisance ordinance was enacted in the municipality. 𝛼- and 𝛾. 
represent municipality and year fixed effects, respectively. Municipality fixed effects control for 
any variation in the prevalence of domestic violence driven by inherent differences in municipality 
characteristics. Year fixed effects control for broad changes in domestic violence that have 
occurred over time.  
The coefficient 𝛽3 estimates differential changes in domestic violence in municipalities 
with nuisance ordinances after those ordinances were enacted relative to changes in domestic 
violence in municipalities without nuisance ordinances over the same time period. Comparing the 
sign of 𝛽3 when 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒-. is a measure of reported domestic violence versus when 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒-. is a measure of domestic violence incidence informs the extent of nuisance 
ordinances’ impact. For example, if 𝛽3 is consistently negative both when 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒-. 
is a measure of reported domestic violence and when 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒-. is a measure of 
domestic violence incidence, then this would suggest that the decrease in reported domestic 
violence reflects nuisance ordinances discouraging the incidence of domestic violence – consistent 
with the intended goal of nuisance ordinances as a crime prevention policy. Alternatively, if 𝛽3 is 
negative when 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒-. is a measure of reported domestic violence but positive when 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒-. is a measure of domestic violence incidence, then this would indicate that 
nuisance ordinances only impact reporting behavior and not the underlying occurrence of the crime 
itself.  
In order to interpret 𝛽3 as the causal effect of nuisance ordinances on domestic violence, I 
assume trends in domestic violence would have been parallel in municipalities with and without 
nuisance ordinances in the absence of an ordinance being enacted. The inclusion of municipality 
fixed effects in the DD model captures time-invariant differences in domestic violence trends 
between these municipalities. To strengthen the validity of the parallel trends assumption, I add 
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county-specific linear trends as well as other time-varying control variables to account for any 
time-varying differences that could bias my results.  
An event study analysis further evaluates potential bias from differential trends. This 
estimation takes the form: 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐	𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒-.= 𝛽1 + 𝛽35	𝑜𝑟	𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠	𝑝𝑟𝑒	𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒-. + 𝛽<4	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠	𝑝𝑟𝑒	𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒-. …+ 𝛽?1	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝑝𝑟𝑒	𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒-. + 𝛽A1	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒-.	+ 𝛽B2	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠	𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒-. …+ 𝛽315	𝑜𝑟	𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠	𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒-.+ 𝛼- + 𝛾. + 𝜀-. 
I generate dummy variables for each number of years since a nuisance ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality. These coefficients estimate differences in domestic violence between municipalities 
with a nuisance ordinance and municipalities without a nuisance ordinance at varying numbers of 
years since an ordinance’s enactment. Zero years since nuisance ordinance enactment is the 
omitted time period. For the event study results to support the parallel trends assumption, the pre-
ordinance coefficients should not be statistically different from zero or exhibit a particular pattern. 
If the nuisance ordinances have an effect on domestic violence, then the post-ordinance 
coefficients should also be statistically significant. An additional benefit of this specification is the 
flexibility in estimating the impact of the ordinances, allowing the effect to be growing over time, 
decreasing over time, or even non-monotonic.  
 
4 Data and Results 
My dataset of nuisance ordinances consists of ordinances in 83 U.S. municipalities, 
including information on the date an ordinance was enacted and whether domestic violence is 
explicitly exempt or included in the ordinance’s list of nuisance activities. Nuisance ordinances in 
the dataset span 29 states and range in year of enactment from 1962 to 2017. I compiled data on 
these ordinances from the Temple University Policy Surveillance Program’s “City Nuisance 
Property Ordinances” database (2017), which tracked nuisance ordinances across the 40 most 
populous U.S. cities, the online supplement to Desmond and Valdez (2012), which additionally 
recorded nuisance ordinances outside the most populous cities through a systematic Internet 
search, and Fais’s (2008) law review article on nuisance ordinances. I assume municipalities that 
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are not included in any of these sources have never enacted nuisance ordinances. However, it is 
possible that there are municipalities with nuisance ordinances unrecorded in these sources. To the 
extent that any municipalities’ nuisance ordinances were missed, my estimates will be 
conservatively biased against finding significant effects of ordinance enactment on domestic 
violence between municipalities with and without nuisance ordinances. Table 1 summarizes the 
location and characteristics of the nuisance ordinances in my dataset.2 
 
4.1 California Analysis 
I rely on California for my analysis of reported domestic violence because of data 
availability.3 To track domestic violence reporting in California, I utilize 911 call data for domestic 
violence-related incidents received by municipal law enforcement agencies in California. For 
domestic violence incidence in California, I use the California Women’s Health Survey, which 
contains survey questions about women’s experiences with domestic violence as well as 
municipality identifiers.        
 
4.1.1 Effect on Reported Domestic Violence in California 
Data 
 To measure reported domestic violence in California, I use the Domestic Violence-Related 
Calls for Assistance dataset from the California Department of Justice. The data provides the total 
number of domestic violence-related calls for assistance reported by 809 law enforcement agencies 
on a monthly basis between the years 1995 and 2016. Because nuisance ordinances are primarily 
enacted through municipal governments, I restrict my analyses to the 473 municipality-level 
agencies in the data; highway and transit authorities, university police departments, county 
sheriffs, and any other non-municipality-level agencies were excluded from my analyses. Seven 
municipalities in California have enacted nuisance ordinances: San Jose (1998), San Diego (2007), 
                                               
2 See Appendix Table A1 for a full list of the 83 nuisance ordinances in my dataset by state, municipality, and year of 
enactment. 
3 The FBI’s National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) program, 
which compiles reporting data on crimes (including the victim-offender relationship) from law enforcement agencies, 
is an available measure of reported domestic violence on a national scale. However, agency participation in the UCR 
is voluntary; few agencies in municipalities with nuisance ordinances were represented in the NIBRS. 
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Los Angeles (2008), Long Beach (2011), Fresno (2016), Sacramento (2016), and San Francisco 
(2016).4  
Table 2 compares the average monthly domestic violence-related calls for assistance in 
municipalities with ordinances versus municipalities without ordinances in the first and last year 
of the data. Average calls fell overall by 2016, by which point all nuisance ordinances in California 
had gone into effect. This decline is especially evident in municipalities with ordinances; average 
calls decreased by 48.21 percent between 1995 and 2016, whereas municipalities without 
ordinances only experienced a 20.24 percent reduction in average calls over the same period. The 
differences in average calls between municipalities with ordinances and municipalities without 
ordinances – even in the earliest year of data before any ordinances were enacted – are large and 
statistically significant, suggesting that municipalities with ordinances differ from municipalities 
without ordinances. To the extent that these differences are time-invariant, they will be captured 
in the municipality fixed effects included in my model and will not bias my results. The inclusion 
of county-specific linear trends or county-year interaction fixed effects helps eliminate bias from 
differences across these areas that might be time-varying.5 To capture time-varying trends at the 
municipality-level, I also control for total homicides in a municipality as a proxy for a 
municipality’s susceptibility to violent crime in addition to whether a municipality enacted a no-
drop policy, which could affect rates of domestic violence (Aizer & Dal Bó, 2009).6   
 
Results 
 Table 3 estimates the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on domestic violence-related 
calls for assistance in a municipality. All regressions include both municipality and call date 
                                               
4 Note that because Fresno, Sacramento, and San Francisco enacted nuisance ordinances in the final year of available 
data (2016), the post-ordinance period for these municipalities only includes a few months of data. 
5 Nuisance ordinances are municipality-level policies; however, some counties include multiple municipalities where 
nuisance ordinances have been enacted. Of municipalities with nuisance ordinances in California, Los Angeles and 
Long Beach are located in the same county (Los Angeles County). Thus, specifications with county-year interaction 
fixed effects are estimated only from variation in same-county nuisance ordinances in Los Angeles and Long Beach.  
6 Data on homicides is from the California Department of Justice’s Crimes and Clearances dataset, which provides 
the total number of offenses and clearances for various crimes reported annually by municipal law enforcement 
agencies as part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting program between the years 1985 
and 2017. Data on no-drop policies is from Aizer & Dal Bó (2009). Similar to state-level mandatory arrest policies as 
discussed in Section 2.2, municipalities enact no-drop policies to compel prosecutors to continue with the prosecution 
of domestic violence cases even if the victim wishes to drop charges.  
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(month-year) fixed effects. I use the log of total calls to estimate a proportional effect, which also 
allows for comparability across other specifications.7 The coefficient on “post-ordinance” – an 
indicator variable that equals one if the total calls in a given month were recorded after a nuisance 
ordinance had been enacted in that municipality – is -0.232, as shown in the main specification in 
column 1. This means that municipalities with nuisance ordinances experienced a 23.2 percent 
reduction in domestic violence-related calls for assistance after their ordinance was enacted 
relative to municipalities without nuisance ordinances. The estimate is statistically significant and 
economically significant in magnitude (nearly one fifth of a standard deviation in the log of total 
calls for municipality-level agencies). I add county-specific linear trends, county-year interaction 
fixed effects, and municipality-level controls in subsequent columns to further control for any 
time-varying differences in pre-existing domestic violence reporting trends between 
municipalities. Although slightly smaller in magnitude, the estimated effect of ordinance 
enactment on reported domestic violence remains negative and statistically significant.  
To clarify whether this decrease in reported domestic violence can actually be attributed to 
a decline in the underlying occurrence of domestic violence or if the decrease merely reflects the 
impact of nuisance ordinances on reporting behavior, I next explore the effect of nuisance 
ordinances on domestic violence incidence. 
 
4.1.2 Effect on Domestic Violence Incidence in California 
Data 
The California Women’s Health Survey (CWHS) provides a measure of domestic violence 
incidence in California. The CWHS is an annual telephone survey conducted between 1997 and 
2012 by the California Department of Healthcare Services and Department of Public Health. Each 
year, the survey collects information on a variety of demographic characteristics and health 
indicators – including respondents’ experiences with domestic violence – from a random sample 
                                               
7 The results are robust to a linear specification; see Appendix Table A2. Municipalities that received zero calls in a 
given month (40.05 percent of observations) were excluded when generating the log of total calls. Given the larger 
population sizes of cities with ordinances, the exclusion of these smaller municipalities that received zero calls from 
the control group likely improves the balance between municipalities with and without ordinances. Appendix Table 
A3 reports the regressions from Table 3 using the log of total domestic violence-related calls plus one in order to avoid 
dropping municipalities that received zero calls in a given month. These results are slightly larger in magnitude but 
consistent with the results in Table 3. 
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of approximately 4,000 adult women. Although the majority of years of the CWHS include 
questions on respondents’ experiences with domestic violence, the particular survey questions vary 
by year.8 Therefore, I generated an indicator variable across all survey years that equals one when 
a respondent answers affirmatively to any of the questions in that survey year related to physical 
or sexual abuse by an intimate partner.9 This indicator is the dependent variable in my main results 
for this section. The dataset includes survey respondents from 84 major municipalities in 
California, including four municipalities – San Jose (1998), San Diego (2007), Los Angeles 
(2008), and Long Beach (2011) – that enacted nuisance ordinances during the dataset’s time 
period. The data also includes respondents whose municipality was redacted due to privacy 
concerns; all municipalities that span less than five zip codes were redacted to limit the ability to 
identify individual respondents.10  
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the survey data, including variable comparisons 
between municipalities that enacted nuisance ordinances and those that did not. P-values of 
difference show that respondents’ experiences with domestic violence in municipalities with 
ordinances were not significantly different from those of respondents in municipalities without 
ordinances, supporting my identifying assumption. To address potential demographic differences 




 Panel A of Table 5 estimates the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on the probability 
a respondent experienced physical or sexual abuse by her partner in a municipality. All regressions 
include municipality and year fixed effects. Because municipality was redacted for municipalities 
with fewer than five zip codes, I also include county fixed effects to further control for differences 
in pre-existing domestic violence trends between municipalities since these redacted 
                                               
8 No domestic violence-related questions were asked in 1997-1999, 2002, or 2010. Thus, these survey years are not 
considered in my analyses. 
9 The questions included in this indicator variable ask whether in the past 12 months, the respondent’s partner beat 
them up, choked them, pushed them, slapped them, kicked or hit them (or threatened to do so), tried to hit them with 
an object or threw an object at them, used a knife or gun on them (or threatened to do so), or forced sex.  
10 Respondents in redacted municipalities represent 50.04 percent of respondents across all years in the dataset; no 
municipalities with ordinances were redacted. 
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municipalities span different counties. The coefficient on “post-ordinance” is 0.007, as shown in 
the main specification in column 1. This means that the probability a respondent experienced 
domestic violence increased by 0.7 percentage points after a nuisance ordinance was enacted in 
the respondent’s municipality relative to respondents in municipalities without nuisance 
ordinances. The estimate is statistically significant and robust to the addition of county-specific 
linear trends, county-year interaction fixed effects, and municipality-level controls in subsequent 
columns. The estimate in the column 6 specification with both county-year fixed effects and 
municipality controls is smaller in magnitude and lacks statistical significance but remains positive 
in sign.11 Overall, these results are supportive of an increase in domestic violence incidence in 
municipalities with nuisance ordinances following ordinance enactment. 
Panel B estimates the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on the probability a 
respondent sought help from the police for an incident of domestic violence. Because this survey 
question was only asked between 2007 and 2009, the result is estimated off of temporal variation 
in Los Angeles where a nuisance ordinance was enacted in 2008; all other nuisance ordinances in 
California were enacted outside of the 2007-2009 time period. Nevertheless, respondents were 8.6 
percentage points less likely to request police services for a domestic violence incident after the 
enactment of a nuisance ordinance according to the main specification in column 1. This estimate 
is robust to the addition of county-specific linear trends, county-year fixed effects, and 
municipality-level controls in subsequent columns, and grows to -11.9 percentage points with the 
addition of county trends in column 3 and with the addition of both county-year fixed effects and 
municipality controls in column 6. All results are statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level and support the hypothesis that nuisance ordinances discourage domestic violence 
reporting, thus allowing the incidence of domestic violence to persist. 
 
4.1.3 Addressing Threats to Identification 
Parallel Trends Assumption 
The identifying assumption necessary to infer a causal effect of nuisance ordinances on 
domestic violence depends on parallel trends in domestic violence across municipalities with and 
                                               
11 Recall that specifications including county-year interaction fixed effects are only driven by variation in nuisance 
ordinances enacted in municipalities within the same county (Long Beach and Los Angeles of Los Angeles County) 
as discussed in Footnote 5. 
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without nuisance ordinances in the absence of an ordinance being enacted. If rates of domestic 
violence reporting or incidence in municipalities with nuisance ordinances are evolving on 
different trends than municipalities without nuisance ordinances, then this would violate the 
parallel trends assumption and suggest that my estimates do not identify a causal effect of nuisance 
ordinances on domestic violence. In order to bias my results, these differential trends for domestic 
violence reporting and incidence would need to evolve in opposite directions; differential trends 
would need to simultaneously explain a decrease in domestic violence reporting and an increase 
in domestic violence incidence. Note that the results presented in the previous two sections are 
largely robust to the inclusion of county-specific linear trends, county-year interaction fixed 
effects, and municipality-level controls. Nevertheless, I further investigate potential bias from 
differential trends through event study analyses.  
Figure 1 plots estimates from an event study for the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment 
on reported domestic violence, as measured by the log of total domestic violence-related calls for 
assistance in a municipality. I add both municipality and call date (month-year) fixed effects.12 As 
explained in Section 3, the event study decomposes the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on 
a year-by-year basis to observe the resulting trends in domestic violence over time. Each dot on 
the figure represents a coefficient estimate of the difference between domestic violence in that year 
relative to the year of ordinance enactment. The coefficients are centered around the year of 
enactment (zero years since ordinance enactment), which is the omitted time period. Following the 
drop in reported domestic violence at five or more years pre-ordinance, the pre-ordinance 
coefficients do not appear in a particular pattern in the years immediately preceding ordinance 
enactment. Except the coefficient on five or more years pre-ordinance, the pre-ordinance 
coefficients are not individually statistically significant.13 Although an F-test of the joint 
significance of all pre-ordinance coefficients produces a statistically significant p-value, the 
coefficients up to four years pre-ordinance are not jointly significant when the five or more years 
                                               
12 See Appendix Table A4 (column 1) for the full results of the event study that correspond with the plotted estimates 
in Figure 1. I add county-specific linear trends, county-year interaction fixed effects, and municipality-level controls 
in subsequent columns. 
13 To assess whether the results – particularly, the estimates on the five or more years pre-ordinance coefficient – are 
driven by one city’s ordinance, I estimated four separate regressions (following the main specification presented in 
Figure 1), dropping one treatment city from each. This did not significantly change my results. 
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pre-ordinance coefficient is excluded from the F-test.14 These observations all lend credibility to 
the parallel trends assumption. An F-test of the joint significance of the post-ordinance coefficients 
produces a statistically significant p-value at the 99 percent confidence level and the post-
ordinance coefficients form a downward trend, further supporting my finding that nuisance 
ordinance enactment decreased domestic violence reporting.  
Figure 2 plots estimates from an event study for the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment 
on domestic violence incidence, as measured by the probability a respondent of the California 
Women’s Health Survey experienced physical or sexual abuse by her partner. I include 
municipality (when available), county, and year fixed effects as described in Section 4.1.2.15 While 
estimates for the pre-ordinance coefficients are not consistently significant individually, an F-test 
of the joint significance of all pre-ordinance coefficients produces a statistically significant p-
value. Nevertheless, the pre-ordinance coefficients do not exhibit a particular trend; if anything, 
domestic violence incidence appears to have been decreasing in the years immediately preceding 
ordinance enactment. By contrast, an F-test of the joint significance of all post-ordinance 
coefficients produces a statistically significant p-value at the 99 percent confidence level and the 
post-ordinance coefficients exhibit a clear upward trend, confirming my results that nuisance 
ordinance enactment increased domestic violence incidence. 
 
Endogeneity of Ordinance Enactment 
A related threat to identifying the causal effect of nuisance ordinances concerns whether 
municipalities’ enactment of nuisance ordinances was endogenous. It is plausible that a 
municipality chooses to adopt a nuisance ordinance in response to crime waves in the municipality. 
If such an endogeneity problem exists, then differences in domestic violence reporting or incidence 
may merely reflect these crime waves – including fluctuations in the prevalence of domestic 
violence – rather than the effect of the ordinances. Furthermore, the endogenous enactment of 
nuisance ordinances during a period of rising crime unique to a municipality would likely bias the 
                                               
14 An F-test of the joint significance of the coefficients for pre-1 year, pre-2 years, pre-3 years, and pre-4 years produces 
a p-value of 0.203 for the regression specified in column 1, 0.286 for column 2, 0.721 for column 3, 0.309 for column 
4, 0.341 for column 5, and 0.798 for column 6. 
15 See Appendix Table A5 (column 1) for the full results of the event study that correspond with the plotted estimates 
in Figure 2. I add county-specific linear trends, county-year interaction fixed effects, and municipality-level controls 
in subsequent columns. 
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estimated effect of the ordinances. An ordinance effect that appears to reduce reported crime could 
simply represent crime returning from a heightened state to prior levels. Thus, the endogenous 
enactment of nuisance ordinances in response to a municipality’s spike in crime could cause the 
ordinances to appear overly impactful in reducing reported crimes such as domestic violence.  
It is worth noting that the event studies presented above did not demonstrate a spike in 
domestic violence reporting or incidence prior to ordinance enactment. Since nuisance ordinances 
address criminal activity more broadly, Figure 3 plots estimates from an event study for other 
reported crimes in California.16 I include both municipality and year fixed effects.17 The majority 
of the pre-ordinance coefficients are not statistically significant; an F-test of the joint significance 
of all pre-ordinance coefficients does not yield a statistically significant p-value.18 Overall, these 
results suggest that nuisance ordinances were not enacted in response to sharp increases in a 
municipality’s crime levels, thereby easing the threat of endogenous ordinance enactment. In fact, 
other reported crimes appear to form a downward trend following ordinance enactment, perhaps 
suggestive of nuisance ordinances’ claimed objective of crime deterrence. Thus, my finding of 
increased domestic violence incidence in municipalities with nuisance ordinances following 
ordinance enactment as described in Section 4.1.2 is particularly compelling in contrast to this 
decline in other reported crimes. Nevertheless, evaluating an adverse effect of increased domestic 
violence incidence alongside a favorable reduction in other reported crimes complicates welfare 
calculations for the overall impact of nuisance ordinances; I leave this to future work. 
Considering nuisance ordinances’ purported goal as a crime prevention effort, it is also 
plausible that municipalities enacted nuisance ordinances as part of a broader “tough on crime” 
                                               
16 To measure other reported crimes in California, I use the Crimes and Clearances dataset from the California 
Department of Justice as described in Footnote 6. “Reported crimes” is defined as the sum of homicide, rape, robbery, 
and aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. 
17 See Appendix Table A6 (column 1) for the full results of the event study that correspond with the plotted estimates 
in Figure 3. I add county-specific linear trends in column 2 and county-year interaction fixed effects in column 3. 
18 An F-test of the joint significance of all pre-ordinance coefficients when county-year interaction fixed effects are 
included in the event study regression specification (column 3 of Appendix Table A6) does produce a statistically 
significant p-value (0.000). However, specifications including county-year interaction fixed effects are only driven by 
variation in nuisance ordinances enacted in municipalities within the same county (Long Beach and Los Angeles of 
Los Angeles County) as discussed in Footnote 5. Although not all individually significant, the pre-ordinance 
coefficients in this specification are negative in sign in the years immediately preceding ordinance enactment. Thus, 
even if reported crime was indeed trending downward prior to ordinance enactment, these municipalities do not appear 
to have enacted ordinances in response to a notable rise in crime. 
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policy agenda. If so, the effect of nuisance ordinances could be confounded by the effects of other 
similarly-timed policies that also impact domestic violence or other crimes.19 I am less concerned 
with this possibility, however, because most policies during this period were enacted at the federal- 
or state-level; my analyses of nuisance ordinances focused exclusively on California municipalities 
would only be biased if other municipality-level crime policies coincided with California 
municipalities’ nuisance ordinance enactment. That my results are robust to controlling for 
municipality-level no-drop policies provides further evidence against this concern.         
 
Resident Mobility 
Local population changes following nuisance ordinance enactment could confound my 
results if there is a substitution of residents who are more likely to experience domestic violence 
but less likely to report domestic violence. To test this possibility, I first re-estimate my results 
from Table 5 – the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on the probability a CWHS respondent 
experienced domestic violence and the probability a respondent sought help from the police for an 
incident of domestic violence – but also include controls for demographic characteristics. The 
demographic controls inform whether particular demographic groups experience or report 
domestic violence differently. In addition, I utilize migration data from the American Community 
Survey to test whether any of these demographic groups that were more likely to experience but 
less likely to report domestic violence were also more likely to move into municipalities with 
nuisance ordinances in California following nuisance ordinance enactment.20 
Table 6 presents these results. Columns 1 and 2 evaluate whether certain demographic 
groups are more likely to experience domestic violence but less likely to report domestic violence, 
respectively. These regressions include municipality, county, and year fixed effects. Note that the 
estimates on the main “post-ordinance” coefficient are consistent with my initial estimates from 
Table 5, even after demographic controls are added to this version of the regression specification. 
                                               
19 Previous studies evaluating the effects of various policy changes on domestic violence have accounted for the timing 
of other domestic violence-related policies such as the Family Violence Prevention Services Act, unilateral divorce 
laws, and mandatory arrest laws (Aizer & Dal Bó, 2009; Iyengar, 2009; Miller & Segal, 2018; Stevenson & Wolfers, 
2006).  
20 I use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census between the years 1990 and 2017. The 
ACS defines migration as changing residence (either moving within state, moving between states, or abroad) since a 
reference point of one year ago. I limit my ACS sample to adult females in California to match the sample of the 
CWHS. 
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The probability a respondent experienced domestic violence increased after a nuisance ordinance 
was enacted in the respondent’s municipality, while the probability a respondent requested police 
services for a domestic violence incident decreased following ordinance enactment. Although not 
consistently significant, Black respondents, Asian/Pacific Islander respondents, and respondents 
of other races are more likely to experience domestic violence but less likely to seek help for the 
abuse from the police relative to White respondents.  
Column 3 estimates the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on migration for females 
in California, including interaction variables for demographic characteristics to inform whether 
ordinance enactment has a differential effect on migration for respondents of certain demographic 
groups. The regression includes municipality and year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates for 
the post-ordinance interaction terms with demographic groups that are more likely to experience 
domestic violence but less likely to report domestic violence to the police – Black and 
Asian/Pacific Islander respondents as well as respondents of other races – are all negative in sign, 
meaning female respondents of these demographic groups are less likely to have recently moved 
into municipalities with nuisance ordinances in California after an ordinance was enacted. This 
suggests that my findings of decreased domestic violence reporting and increased domestic 
violence incidence following nuisance ordinance enactment are not biased by a substitution of 
residents who are more likely to experience domestic violence but less likely to report their abuse. 
It is worth noting that Medi-Cal recipients (which I use as a proxy for low-income status) are also 
significantly less likely to have recently moved into municipalities with nuisance ordinances 
following ordinance enactment. That respondents of racial minorities and of low-income status 
have a lower propensity to move-in in response to ordinance enactment hints to the ulterior motive 
of nuisance ordinances as an exclusionary mechanism, as discussed in Section 2.1. 
 
4.2 Nationwide Proxies for Domestic Violence Incidence 
In this section, I expand my analysis of the effect of nuisance ordinances on domestic 
violence incidence to a national scale. Nationwide data on domestic violence incidence with 
geographic identifiers smaller than state is difficult to find.21 Here, I utilize two proxies for 
                                               
21 The FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) provides a nationwide database of homicides at the agency-
level, including information on the victim-offender relationship necessary to identify incidents of intimate partner 
homicide, as part of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) program. Yet as noted in Footnote 3, agency participation in 
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domestic violence incidence: county-level vital statistics data on female mortality from assault, 
and Google Trends data to assess metro-level changes in the prevalence of online search activity 
related to domestic violence. 
 
4.2.1 Female Mortality from Assault 
Data 
 Female mortality from assault can serve as a proxy for intimate partner homicide, which 
may provide insight into the impact of nuisance ordinances on domestic violence incidence. This 
is an imperfect but advantageous measure of domestic violence incidence for several reasons. First, 
mortality data avoids reporting bias because, unlike survey data, it does not require that women 
admit they experienced abuse. Second, although women are not the only gender to experience 
domestic violence, an estimated 76 percent of women who are assaulted are assaulted by an 
intimate partner (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). Thus, female mortality from assault is a reasonable 
proxy for intimate partner homicide even if the victim-offender relationship is uncertain. However, 
as noted above, mortality is an extreme outcome of domestic violence. It is possible that nuisance 
ordinances affect domestic violence incidence, but not at this margin. 
Data on female mortality from assault comes from the National Vital Statistics System of 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The data is at the incident-level and includes 
information on the cause of death, place of death, and demographic characteristics of the deceased 
as well as county identifiers from 1990 to 2016. I consider a death as an intimate partner homicide 
if the cause of death was assault, the victim was female, and the place of death was at home. I 
additionally restrict the data to ages 20-54, the age group for which domestic violence is most 
prevalent (Aizer & Dal Bó, 2009). I aggregated these incidents of intimate partner homicide in 
each county for each year of data. Nuisance ordinances were enacted in municipalities within 60 
counties during the dataset’s time period. Note that nuisance ordinances are enacted at the 
municipality-level, but the mortality data is aggregated to the county-level, which introduces 
                                               
the UCR is voluntary; few agencies in municipalities with nuisance ordinances are represented in the SHR. An ideal 
data source for a nationwide analysis of domestic violence incidence would be the National Crime Victimization 
Survey (NCVS), which gathers detailed data on domestic violence incidence – even when not reported to the police. 
However, matching observations with municipality-level ordinances is impossible without difficult-to-obtain 
restricted use approvals. 
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measurement error in my independent variable of interest.22 I also aggregated incidents of male 
deaths by assault to include as a control.  
 Table 7 compares the average totals of female deaths by assault at home in municipalities 
with nuisance ordinances versus municipalities without nuisance ordinances in the first and last 
years of the data. Although average levels of female mortality from assault increased overall by 
2016, this increase was more pronounced for municipalities without ordinances. The differences 
in female mortality between municipalities with and without ordinances are also statistically 
significant, which could bias my results. I add state-specific linear trends, state-year interaction 
fixed effects, and county-level controls to capture any time-varying differences at the county- and 
state-levels, in addition to county and year fixed effects. 
 
Results 
 Table 8 estimates the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on female deaths by assault 
that occurred in the home. All regressions include both county and year fixed effects. I add state-
specific linear trends, state-year interaction fixed effects, and county-level controls in subsequent 
columns to further control for potential differential trends in domestic violence incidence between 
counties. Although the estimates are consistently positive in sign, I do not observe a significant 
effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on domestic violence incidence as measured by female 
mortality from assault.23 However, I hesitate to draw conclusions from these results. First, as noted 
above, I applied municipality-level nuisance ordinance data to county-level mortality data. Yet 
                                               
22 Phoenix (1962) and Mesa (2009) both enacted ordinances within Maricopa County; however, the date of ordinance 
enactment in Phoenix is outside the time scope of the mortality data. Thus, Mesa (2009) represents Maricopa County, 
AZ. Elm Grove Village (2008) and Hartland Village (2008) jointly represent Waukesha County, WI; Madison (2008) 
and Middleton (2008) jointly represent Dane County, WI. The following ordinances were excluded from the mortality 
analyses because multiple municipalities within the same county enacted ordinances in different years: Long Beach 
(2011) and Los Angeles (2008) in Los Angeles County, CA; Mundelein (2004) and Village of Wauconda (2008) in 
Lake County, IL; Village of Addison (2009) and West Chicago City (2008) in DuPage County, IL; Beaverton (1998) 
and Tigard (2003) in Washington County, OR; Hazleton (2009) and Wilkes-Barre (2005) in Luzerne County, PA; 
Menasha (2008) and Oshkosh (2010) in Winnebago County. 
23 As a placebo, Appendix Table A7 estimates the effect of ordinance enactment on male deaths by assault outside the 
home. Because these deaths occurred away from home, they would not have been influenced by a nuisance ordinance 
policy. Indeed, the estimates are not statistically significant, indicating male assaults outside the home did not change 
following ordinance enactment. Though not significant overall, that the estimates on female mortality at home 
(positive) and male mortality from assault away from home (negative) are opposite in sign suggests any effect of 
ordinance enactment on intimate partner homicide was not confounded by broader trends in declining crime.  
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changes in domestic violence incidence in a municipality that enacted a nuisance ordinance may 
not represent changes in domestic violence in other municipalities within the same county. Thus, 
one municipality’s ordinance effect on domestic violence aggregated to the county-level may not 
accurately reflect changes in domestic violence for all municipalities in the county. Second, 
mortality is an extreme outcome of domestic violence. That nuisance ordinances do not appear to 
wield a significant influence over intimate partner homicides does not necessarily imply that 
nuisance ordinances did not impact less severe forms of abuse, such as those asked about in the 
California Women’s Health Survey. 
 
4.2.2 Google Trends 
Data 
 Measuring changes in online search activity related to domestic violence serves as a less 
extreme proxy for domestic violence incidence on a national scale. Web search data can provide 
insight on domestic violence incidence in several ways. Although many victims of domestic 
violence choose not to report their abuse as discussed in Section 2.2, victims may still search for 
information on available resources. Family members, friends, or neighbors suspicious of abuse 
might also look for information or resources online. In both scenarios, web search data could 
account for cases of domestic violence that were otherwise unreported. 
 To analyze online search activity related to domestic violence, I use data from Google 
Trends. Google Trends records the number of annual searches for a given search term as a fraction 
of the total number of searches conducted that year in a Designated Market Area (DMA), a 
geographic unit similar to a metropolitan area. These search rates comprise an indexed value for 
the frequency at which Google users in a particular DMA searched for the term relative to users in 
other DMAs that year. Due to the high volume of searches conducted on Google, Google Trends 
calculates search indices by sampling from its underlying database each day.24 Because Google 
                                               
24 To reduce sampling variability, I repeated the process of downloading the Google Trends data for five days. Search 
index values in my dataset represent the averaged index values across the five days. Only DMA-years present in all 
five days of data were included in the averages; 87 DMA-year observations were dropped from the “domestic 
violence” search topic, 378 DMA-year observations were dropped from the “women’s shelter” search topic, 195 
DMA-year observations were dropped from the “eviction” search topic, and 45 DMA-year observations were dropped 
from the “gender” search topic because that DMA-year was not present in all five days of data. Appendix Table A8 
reports the regressions from Table 9 using the full dataset of DMA-years to calculate the averaged search index values 
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Trends presents the search data as indexed values, my results relying on Google Trends should be 
interpreted as changes in the relative direction of search activity rather than changes in the absolute 
number of searches for a particular search term. Similar search index values for different search 
terms do not necessarily reflect similar quantities in the absolute number of searches for those 
search terms; a DMA with a high search index value simply means that searches for the given 
search term comprised a substantial proportion of the total searches conducted in the DMA relative 
to other DMAs that year. Thus, my analysis is limited to evaluating whether nuisance ordinance 
enactment is associated with an increase or decrease in searches for topics related to domestic 
violence.  
 My dataset from Google Trends includes 210 DMAs’ search index values between 2006 
to 2018 for four search topics: “domestic violence”, “women’s shelter”, “eviction”, and 
“gender”.25 Nuisance ordinances were enacted in municipalities within 35 DMAs during the 
dataset’s time period.26 Given the increase in domestic violence incidence following nuisance 
ordinance enactment in California as reported in Section 4.1.2, I would expect ordinance 
enactment to be associated with an increase in searches within the “domestic violence” topic. 
Similarly, searches related to “women’s shelter” and “eviction” may also increase if more women 
wish to flee abusive relationships, or if more women face homelessness or eviction as a result of 
the ordinances. I include “gender” as a placebo search topic that could trend similarly to search 
topics related to domestic violence. It is plausible that changes in search activity related to domestic 
violence could be driven by broader changes in Google users’ interest in issues affecting women 
rather than actual changes in domestic violence incidence. As a placebo, the relative frequency of 
searches related to “gender” should not change following ordinance enactment. 
 
                                               
without dropping any DMA-years that were present in less than five days of data. These results are consistent with 
the results in Table 9. 
25 Google Trends groups related search terms into search topics. For example, the search topic “women’s shelter” 
encompasses search terms such as “shelters for women and kids”, “domestic violence shelter near me”, and names of 
specific emergency shelters for women experiencing homelessness. 
26 Some DMAs span multiple municipalities that have enacted ordinances; however, no DMA spanned multiple 
municipalities in which multiple ordinances were enacted within the time scope of the Google Trends data. Thus, Fort 
Worth (2014) represents the Dallas (1975)-Fort Worth, TX DMA; San Francisco (2016) represents the San Francisco-
Oakland-San Jose (1998), CA DMA. Note that applying municipality-level ordinance data to DMA-level Google 
Trends data could introduce slight measurement error in my independent variable of interest. 
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Results 
 Table 9 estimates the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on changes in the relative 
frequency of searches for each of the four search topics. All regressions include DMA and year 
fixed effects. The results indicate that nuisance ordinance enactment is associated with a 
statistically significant increase in searches for “women’s shelter” (Panel B) and “eviction” (Panel 
C); these estimates are robust to the addition of state-specific linear trends in column 2 and state-
year interaction fixed effects in column 3. Searches for “domestic violence” (Panel A) also 
increased following ordinance enactment, but the results were not statistically significant. The 
results on the placebo search topic “gender” (Panel D) were neither statistically significant nor 
consistent in sign, validating that the results for “women’s shelter” and “eviction” were not 
necessarily confounded by trends in broader online search interest in gender topics. Overall, these 
patterns in search activity suggest domestic violence incidence nationwide did not decrease and 




This paper contributes the first econometric analysis of the effect of nuisance ordinances 
on domestic violence. Many municipalities have turned to nuisance ordinances as a strategy to 
delegate crime control efforts to landlords at residential properties. Although nuisance ordinances 
appear to reduce other reported crimes, my results suggest that nuisance ordinances additionally 
have the unintended consequence of discouraging domestic violence victims from reporting their 
abuse, thereby allowing the incidence of domestic violence to persist. Using a difference-in-
differences strategy, I find that nuisance ordinance enactment leads to a 16.5-23.2 percent 
reduction in domestic violence-related 911 calls for assistance and a 0.4-0.7 percentage point 
increase in self-reported domestic violence incidence in California. Nationwide, I also find 
nuisance ordinance enactment is associated with a statistically significant increase in online search 
activity related to domestic violence as a proxy for domestic violence incidence.  
While this paper leverages several proxies to measure domestic violence, my analyses 
remain constrained by data availability on domestic violence. Considering survey evidence that 
suggests domestic violence offenses are underreported, it is difficult to disentangle changes in 
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domestic violence reporting from changes in underlying behavior that can result from interventions 
intending to reduce the incidence of domestic violence. In future work, I hope to collect additional 
crime data sources that include information on the victim-offender relationship in order to more 
accurately identify incidents of domestic violence. I also hope to explore the impact of nuisance 
ordinances on other outcomes, such as eviction or homelessness, to better understand the pathways 
through which nuisance ordinances threaten domestic violence survivors’ access to housing. 
My findings of nuisance ordinances’ adverse effects on domestic violence underscore that 
policies aimed at deterring crime should consider their impact not only on potential offenders, but 
also on victims. Policymakers motivated to end domestic violence should ensure a policy’s 
deterrence of a potential offender from perpetrating abuse is not outweighed by a deterrence of 
victims from reporting their abuse. A handful of states and municipalities have recently introduced 
legislation to reform nuisance ordinances. For example, the California State Assembly’s passage 
of AB-2413 in August 2018 prohibits ordinance enforcement against victims of domestic violence 
and other crimes (Tenancy: Law Enforcement and Emergency Assistance, 2018). There have also 
been a growing number of litigation efforts to challenge the constitutionality of and repeal nuisance 
ordinances altogether (American Civil Liberties Union).27 In future work, I intend to investigate 
whether exemptions of domestic violence from nuisance activities as specified in select ordinances 
and ordinance reforms are sufficient to avoid harming domestic violence victims.  
More broadly, studying the impact of nuisance ordinances on domestic violence reveals a 
societal tendency to scrutinize victims’ behavior rather than offenders’ crimes. Blurring the 
distinction between victim and offender when enforcing nuisance ordinances against tenants 
effectively erases the crime of domestic violence. Consequently, nuisance ordinances penalize 
victims’ decision to call 911 while failing to address the abuse that prompted their calls. Not only 
do nuisance ordinances place blame on victims for being unable to stop their abuse or for calling 
for help, but ordinances also reduce domestic violence to a “nuisance” unworthy of police action. 
As Diane, a survivor of domestic violence evicted under a nuisance ordinance, reflects: “To me, 
                                               
27 Legal advocates have filed several claims against nuisance ordinances on the grounds that ordinances violate the 
First Amendment (right to petition, or to call the police), Fourth Amendment (unlawful seizure of property), Eighth 
Amendment (excessive fines or punishment), and Fourteenth Amendment (due process, without the opportunity to 
challenge nuisance citations, and equal protection for female domestic violence victims). Statutory challenges have 
also been proposed under the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of sex, race, or 
disability (Cameron, 2012; Fais, 2008; Gavin, 2014; Mead et al., 2018). 
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that’s what I heard, ‘We don’t care…You a nuisance. You all are nuisance to us’” (Arnold, 2019, 
p. 1119). Understanding the barriers impeding domestic violence survivors’ access to housing and 
safety – including those posed by nuisance ordinances – can help answer why survivors often do 
not “just leave”. With improved awareness of the implications of nuisance ordinances for domestic 
violence survivors, policymakers, landlords, and police forces alike should respond to domestic 
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TABLE 1: Nuisance ordinance summary statistics 
 Frequency Percent 
Region 
Northeast 13 15.66% 
Midwest 27 32.53% 
South 14 16.87% 
West 29 34.94% 
Ordinance characteristics 
Domestic violence exempt from nuisance activities 10 12.05% 
Domestic violence, assault, sexual abuse, or battery explicitly included in 
nuisance activities 
58 69.88% 
 N = 83  
 
 
TABLE 2: California domestic violence-related calls for assistance summary statistics 
VARIABLES Mean SD N 
Municipalities 
w/ ordinance 
(N = 84) 
Municipalities 
w/o ordinance 




calls in 1995 
36.07 189.41 
5,676 
1,029.46 21.15 0.020** 
Monthly DV 
calls in 2016 24.51 98.30 533.13 16.87 0.015** 
Notes: Data is at the agency-month-level, restricted to the 473 municipality-level agencies. San Jose, San Diego, Los 
Angeles, Long Beach, Fresno, Sacramento, and San Francisco comprise the municipalities with ordinances. Note that 
because Fresno, Sacramento, and San Francisco enacted nuisance ordinances in the final year of available data (2016), 
the post-ordinance period for these municipalities only includes a few months of data. The final column provides the 
p-value of the difference between municipalities with ordinances and municipalities without ordinances, using robust 








TABLE 3: Effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on reported domestic violence in California 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Log of total domestic violence-related calls for assistance 
       
Post-ordinance -0.232*** -0.170** -0.176** -0.216*** -0.165** -0.171** 
 (0.0562) (0.0736) (0.0713) (0.0550) (0.0728) (0.0706) 
       
Observations 108,484 108,484 108,484 108,484 108,484 108,484 
R-squared 0.856 0.861 0.866 0.857 0.861 0.866 
       
County trends No Yes No No Yes No 
County*year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Municipality controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: “Post-ordinance" is an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after an ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality. Municipality controls include the log of total homicides and an indicator that the dependent variable was 
recorded after a no-drop policy was enacted in a municipality. All regressions include municipality and call date 























TABLE 4: California Women’s Health Survey summary statistics 







Race      
White only, non-
Hispanic 
59.83% 62,893 48.73% 61.97% 0.087* 
Black only, non-
Hispanic 




6.01% 8.32% 5.56% 0.117 
Other race, non-
Hispanic 
1.09% 0.84% 1.13% 0.034** 
Hispanic 28.04% 31.82% 27.31% 0.460 
Medi-Cal coverage 11.97% 62,886 14.22% 11.54% 0.271 
Married 59.58% 61,916 50.91% 61.28% 0.004*** 
Has child(ren) in 
household 
44.95% 62,895 43.14% 45.30% 0.469 
High school graduate 50.39% 61,822 44.62% 51.53% 0.436 
Employed 51.10% 61,788 52.52% 50.83% 0.174 
Domestic violence      
Experienced 
physical or sexual 
abuse by partner 
0.85% 40,736 0.99% 0.83% 0.192 
Sought help for DV 
from police       
(2007-2009 only) 
0.63% 5,583 0.88% 0.59% 0.543 
Notes: Data is at the person-year-level, including municipality identifiers. San Jose, San Diego, Los Angeles, and 
Long Beach comprise the municipalities with ordinances. The final column provides the p-values of the differences 
between municipalities with ordinances and municipalities without ordinances, using robust standard errors clustered 





TABLE 5: Effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on domestic violence incidence in California 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PANEL A Probability respondent experienced physical or sexual abuse by partner 
       
Post-ordinance 0.00739*** 0.00724*** 0.00525* 0.00744*** 0.00641** 0.00405 
 (0.00161) (0.00204) (0.00278) (0.00187) (0.00263) (0.00347) 
       
Observations 38,945 38,945 38,945 38,945 38,945 38,945 
R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.011 
       
PANEL B Probability respondent sought help for DV incident from police (2007-2009 only) 
       
Post-ordinance -0.0857** -0.0916** -0.119** -0.0859** -0.0939** -0.119** 
 (0.0326) (0.0421) (0.0522) (0.0333) (0.0435) (0.0530) 
       
Observations 5,336 5,336 5,336 5,336 5,336 5,336 
R-squared 0.070 0.112 0.164 0.070 0.112 0.164 
       
       
County trends No Yes No No Yes No 
County*year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Municipality controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: “Post-ordinance" is an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after an ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality. Municipality controls include total homicides and an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded 
after a no-drop policy was enacted in a municipality. All regressions include municipality, county, and year fixed 
effects. County fixed effects are included in addition to municipality fixed effects to control for differences in pre-













TABLE 6: Effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on domestic violence incidence, reporting, and 
migration in California, by demographic characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Probability respondent  









sought help for 
DV incident  
from police 
(2007-2009 only) 
     
Post-ordinance 0.00712*** -0.0877*** 0.0391*** Demographics 
 (0.00168) (0.0316) (0.0133) interacted w/ 
Demographics:    post-ordinance: 
     
Black 0.00504** -0.00225 0.0106 -0.00681 
 (0.00253) (0.00454) (0.0125) (0.00945) 
Asian 0.00183 -0.00199 0.0423*** -0.00880 
 (0.00113) (0.00338) (0.00546) (0.00679) 
Other race 0.00724 -0.0104*** 0.0381*** -0.0121 
 (0.00454) (0.00386) (0.00172) (0.00887) 
Hispanic 0.00351*** 0.00355 0.0181*** -0.0266 
 (0.00116) (0.00418) (0.00622) (0.0169) 
Medi-Cal coverage 0.00961*** 0.00309 0.0259*** -0.0325*** 
 (0.00165) (0.00461) (0.00127) (0.00116) 
Married -0.0104*** -0.00597** -0.0839*** 0.0149*** 
 (0.000901) (0.00239) (0.00137) (0.00135) 
Has child(ren) 0.00628*** 0.000511 0.0167*** -0.0496*** 
 (0.000594) (0.00194) (0.00430) (0.00389) 
HS graduate -0.000296 0.00526 0.0219*** 0.0137*** 
 (0.00170) (0.00452) (0.00357) (0.00229) 
Employed 0.000 0.000200 0.0390*** -0.0241*** 
 (0.000744) (0.00207) (0.00476) (0.00712) 
     
Observations 38,945 5,336 3,028,292 F-test (p-value): 
R-squared 0.011 0.072 0.174 0.000 
     
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: “Post-ordinance" is an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after an ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality. Columns 1 and 2 use data from the California Women’s Health Survey and include municipality, county, 
and year fixed effects; county fixed effects are included in addition to municipality fixed effects to control for 
differences in pre-existing domestic violence trends between redacted municipalities. Column 3 uses data from the 





TABLE 7: Mortality data summary statistics 
VARIABLES Mean SD N 
Counties w/ 
ordinance 
(N = 68) 
Counties w/o 
ordinance 




by assault at 
home in 1990 
0.39 1.66 
3,154 
4.65 0.29 0.000*** 
Female deaths 
by assault at 
home in 2016 
0.62 1.85 6.07 0.49 0.000*** 
Notes: Data is at the county-year-level, restricted to ages 20-54. Municipalities within 68 counties have enacted 
ordinances; ordinances were enacted in municipalities within 60 counties during the dataset’s time period. The final 
column provides the p-value of the difference between counties with municipalities that have enacted ordinances and 
counties without ordinances, using robust standard errors clustered by state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
TABLE 8: Effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on female mortality from assault 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total female deaths by assault at home 
       
Post-ordinance 0.932* 0.908* 0.933* 0.222 0.220 0.243 
 (0.504) (0.464) (0.509) (0.250) (0.257) (0.267) 
       
Observations 85,158 85,158 85,158 81,682 81,682 81,682 
R-squared 0.765 0.770 0.782 0.814 0.815 0.824 
       
State trends No Yes No No Yes No 
State*year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
County controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: “Post-ordinance" is an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after an ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality within a county. County controls include the proportion of a county’s total population that is male, the 
proportion of a county’s total population that is Black, the proportion of a county’s total population that is Hispanic, 
total male deaths by assault in a county, an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after a no-drop policy 
was enacted in a municipality within a county, and the lag number of female deaths by assault in a county, following 







TABLE 9: Effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on Google Trends search topics related to 
domestic violence 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PANEL A “domestic violence” 
    
Post-ordinance 1.237 0.918 1.156 
 (0.942) (1.021) (1.193) 
    
Observations 2,617 2,617 2,617 
R-squared 0.841 0.852 0.882 
    
PANEL B “women’s shelter” 
    
Post-ordinance 3.456*** 4.021*** 4.675*** 
 (0.840) (0.865) (1.515) 
    
Observations 1,732 1,732 1,732 
R-squared 0.689 0.712 0.788 
    
PANEL C “eviction” 
    
Post-ordinance 4.526*** 4.182*** 5.558*** 
 (0.886) (0.695) (1.119) 
    
Observations 2,423 2,423 2,423 
R-squared 0.801 0.825 0.860 
    
PANEL D “gender” 
    
Post-ordinance 0.813 -0.288 -0.618 
 (0.839) (0.691) (0.776) 
    
Observations 2,671 2,671 2,671 
R-squared 0.917 0.923 0.940 
    
    
State trends No Yes No 
State*year fixed effects No No Yes 
    
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: “Post-ordinance" is an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after an ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality within a DMA. All regressions include DMA and year fixed effects. Search index values were averaged 





FIGURE 1: Event study estimates for reported domestic violence 
 
Notes: Zero years since nuisance ordinance enactment is the omitted time period, which also includes municipalities 







FIGURE 2: Event study estimates for domestic violence incidence 
 
Notes: Zero years since nuisance ordinance enactment is the omitted time period, which also includes municipalities 
that never enacted an ordinance. Municipality, county, and year fixed effects are included. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Event study estimates for other reported crimes 
 
Notes: Zero years since nuisance ordinance enactment is the omitted time period, which also includes municipalities 





TABLE A1: Nuisance ordinances by state, municipality, and year of enactment 
Municipality State Year Enacted 
Mesa b AZ 2009 
Phoenix AZ 1962 
Tucson b AZ 2017 
Fresno a CA 2016 
Long Beach b CA 2011 
Los Angeles b CA 2008 
Sacramento b CA 2016 
San Diego CA 2007 
San Francisco b CA 2016 
San Jose b CA 1998 
Boulder b CO 2005 
Colorado Springs b CO 2001 
Denver b CO 1998 
Fort Collins CO 2000 
Washington b DC 2016 
Jacksonville b FL 2017 
Miami FL 2004 
Atlanta b GA 2017 
Aurora b IL 2008 
Bloomington b IL 2009 
Chicago a IL 2010 
Freeport b IL 2005 
Kankakee b IL 1996 
Mundelein IL 2004 
Village of Addison b IL 2009 
Village of Wauconda b IL 2008 
West Chicago City b IL 2008 
Indianapolis IN 2009 
Louisville b KY 2016 
Boston b MA 2014 
Baltimore b MD 2007 
Brunswick b ME 2008 
Detroit MI 1964 
Minneapolis MN 1994 
St. Paul MN 2001 
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Kansas City a, b MO 2008 
St. Louis b MO 2007 
Charlotte a NC 2013 
Omaha NE 2008 
Phillipsburg a NJ 2005 
Albuquerque b NM 2017 
Carson City NV 2005 
Las Vegas b NV 2017 
Auburn NY 2004 
New York b NY 2017 
Rome b NY 1998 
Village of East Rochester a NY 2009 
Cincinnati b OH 2006 
Cleveland b OH 2009 
Columbus OH 2005 
Oklahoma City b OK 2015 
Beaverton b OR 1998 
Bend b OR 2010 
Clackamas County b OR 2002 
Dalles b OR 1998 
Dayton b OR 1999 
Medford b OR 1998 
Portland b OR 2002 
Salem b OR 2009 
Tigard b OR 2003 
Coaldale PA 2006 
Hazleton b PA 2009 
Philadelphia PA 2016 
Pittsburgh PA 2005 
Wilkes-Barre PA 2005 
York b PA 2007 
Nashville b TN 2000 
Dallas a TX 1975 
Fort Worth b TX 2014 
Houston a TX 2006 
San Antonio b TX 2007 
Bremerton b WA 2008 
Everett b WA 2008 
Seattle b WA 2009 
Elm Grove Village b WI 2008 
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Green Bay b WI 2006 
Hartland Village b WI 2008 
Janesville b WI 2008 
Madison a WI 2008 
Menasha b WI 2008 
Middleton b WI 2008 
Milwaukee a, b WI 2007 
Oshkosh b WI 2010 
a Domestic violence exempt from nuisance activities 
b Domestic violence, assault, sexual abuse, or battery explicitly included in nuisance activities 
 
 
TABLE A2: Effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on reported domestic violence in California 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total domestic violence-related calls for assistance 
       
Post-ordinance -396.8** -393.2* -403.5* -135.8*** -133.0*** -135.7*** 
 (201.3) (201.0) (206.9) (52.37) (51.08) (51.98) 
       
Observations 124,872 124,872 124,872 124,872 124,872 124,872 
R-squared 0.923 0.924 0.929 0.955 0.955 0.959 
       
County trends No Yes No No Yes No 
County*year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Municipality controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: “Post-ordinance" is an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after an ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality. Municipality controls include total homicides and an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded 
after a no-drop policy was enacted in a municipality. All regressions include municipality and call date (month-year) 










TABLE A3: Effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on reported domestic violence in California 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total domestic violence-related calls for assistance 
       
Post-ordinance -0.275*** -0.320** -0.275** -0.227*** -0.294** -0.251** 
 (0.0672) (0.135) (0.112) (0.0623) (0.133) (0.110) 
       
Observations 124,872 124,872 124,872 124,872 124,872 124,872 
R-squared 0.834 0.842 0.853 0.836 0.843 0.854 
       
County trends No Yes No No Yes No 
County*year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Municipality controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: “Post-ordinance" is an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after an ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality. Municipality controls include the log of total homicides and an indicator that the dependent variable was 
recorded after a no-drop policy was enacted in a municipality. When generating the logged variables, I added 1 to 
each observation to include municipalities in which zero calls or zero homicides occurred. All regressions include 





TABLE A4: Event study for the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on reported domestic 
violence in California 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Log of total domestic violence-related calls for assistance 
       
Years since ordinance enactment       
       
Pre-5+ years 0.308*** 0.255** 0.202* 0.308*** 0.260** 0.210* 
 (0.117) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112) (0.110) 
Pre-4 years 0.0573 0.0450 0.0275 0.0452 0.0391 0.0254 
 (0.0850) (0.0931) (0.0960) (0.0888) (0.0950) (0.0980) 
Pre-3 years 0.00856 -0.00994 -0.0472 0.00558 -0.0112 -0.0462 
 (0.0487) (0.0502) (0.0931) (0.0505) (0.0512) (0.0916) 
Pre-2 years 0.0328 0.0201 0.0120 0.0304 0.0189 0.00866 
 (0.0375) (0.0388) (0.0644) (0.0414) (0.0410) (0.0645) 
Pre-1 year 0.00753 0.00107 -0.0188 0.00340 -0.00121 -0.0200 
 (0.0317) (0.0323) (0.0446) (0.0323) (0.0326) (0.0436) 
0 years (omitted)       
       
Post-1 year 0.0429 0.0377 0.0293 0.0571 0.0443 0.0355 
 (0.0775) (0.0737) (0.0635) (0.0743) (0.0719) (0.0609) 
Post-2 years -0.0135 -0.0125 -0.0785 0.00770 -0.00217 -0.0668 
 (0.0769) (0.0689) (0.0655) (0.0738) (0.0668) (0.0619) 
Post-3 years 0.00792 0.0150 -0.00894 0.0359 0.0291 0.00431 
 (0.0823) (0.0822) (0.0722) (0.0797) (0.0800) (0.0697) 
Post-4 years -0.0318 -0.0178 -0.0764 -0.0152 -0.0112 -0.0681 
 (0.0763) (0.0763) (0.0680) (0.0726) (0.0736) (0.0655) 
Post-5+ years -0.124 -0.0782 -0.121* -0.112 -0.0730 -0.113* 
 (0.0798) (0.0672) (0.0651) (0.0814) (0.0664) (0.0634) 
       
Observations 108,484 108,484 108,484 108,484 108,484 108,484 
R-squared 0.856 0.861 0.866 0.857 0.861 0.866 
F-tests (p-value)       
Pre-ordinance enactment 0.003 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.011 
Post-ordinance enactment 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.010 
       
County trends Yes Yes No No Yes No 
County*year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Municipality controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The independent variables are indicators of the number of years since a nuisance ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality relative to the year the dependent variable was recorded in that municipality. Zero years since nuisance 
ordinance enactment is the omitted time period, which also includes municipalities that never enacted an ordinance. 
Municipality controls include the log of total homicides and an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded 
 48 
after a no-drop policy was enacted in a municipality. All regressions include municipality and call date (month-year) 
fixed effects.  
 
 
TABLE A5: Event study for the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on domestic violence 
incidence in California 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Probability respondent experienced physical or sexual abuse by partner 
       
Years since ordinance enactment       
       
Pre-5+ years -0.00329 -0.00368 -0.00865** -0.00246 -0.00199 -0.00740 
 (0.00236) (0.00285) (0.00387) (0.00396) (0.00471) (0.00580) 
Pre-4 years -0.00303 -0.00293 -0.00353 -0.00229 -0.00142 -0.00241 
 (0.00488) (0.00546) (0.00535) (0.00476) (0.00573) (0.00603) 
Pre-3 years -0.00224* -0.00231* -0.00117 -0.00168 -0.00115 -0.000298 
 (0.00113) (0.00128) (0.00267) (0.00225) (0.00280) (0.00357) 
Pre-2 years -0.00429 -0.00434 -0.00739 -0.00383 -0.00339 -0.00661 
 (0.00521) (0.00540) (0.00557) (0.00517) (0.00545) (0.00602) 
Pre-1 year -0.0118*** -0.0118*** -0.0165*** -0.0117*** -0.0117*** -0.0164*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00256) (0.00431) (0.00251) (0.00257) (0.00434) 
0 years (omitted)       
       
Post-1 year -0.00501** -0.00496* -0.00770 -0.00526** -0.00547** -0.00805 
 (0.00251) (0.00264) (0.00545) (0.00228) (0.00248) (0.00550) 
Post-2 years 0.00529** 0.00523* -0.00224 0.00534** 0.00503* -0.00216 
 (0.00254) (0.00297) (0.00423) (0.00251) (0.00289) (0.00418) 
Post-3 years 0.00956*** 0.00997*** 0.00398 0.00885*** 0.00858*** 0.00284 
 (0.00188) (0.00232) (0.00424) (0.00232) (0.00287) (0.00418) 
Post-4 years 0.00365 0.00338 -0.000547 0.00331 0.00253 -0.00115 
 (0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0108) (0.0116) 
Post-5+ years 0.0157*** 0.0142*** 0.00802* 0.0156*** 0.0138*** 0.00797* 
 (0.00215) (0.00332) (0.00482) (0.00198) (0.00329) (0.00477) 
       
Observations 38,945 38,945 38,945 38,945 38,945 38,945 
R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.011 
F-tests (p-value)       
Pre-ordinance enactment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Post-ordinance enactment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
County trends Yes Yes No No Yes No 
County*year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Municipality controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
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Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The independent variables are indicators of the number of years since a nuisance ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality relative to the year the dependent variable was recorded in that municipality. Zero years since nuisance 
ordinance enactment is the omitted time period, which also includes municipalities that never enacted an ordinance. 
Municipality controls include total homicides and an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after a no-
drop policy was enacted in a municipality. All regressions include municipality, county, and year fixed effects. County 
fixed effects are included in addition to municipality fixed effects to control for differences in pre-existing domestic 





TABLE A6: Event study for the effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on other reported crimes 
in California 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log of total crimes reported 
    
Years since ordinance enactment    
    
Pre-5+ years 0.0879 0.166* 0.144* 
 (0.0968) (0.0994) (0.0807) 
Pre-4 years 0.0518 0.0580 -0.0233 
 (0.0590) (0.0613) (0.0761) 
Pre-3 years 0.0123 0.0251 -0.0786 
 (0.0238) (0.0332) (0.0571) 
Pre-2 years 0.0115 0.0198 -0.0635* 
 (0.0123) (0.0193) (0.0330) 
Pre-1 year 0.00385 0.00822 -0.0560*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0246) (0.0209) 
0 years (omitted)    
    
Post-1 year -0.0479 0.0501 0.00413 
 (0.0617) (0.0640) (0.0590) 
Post-2 years -0.137** -0.0339 -0.0764 
 (0.0626) (0.0673) (0.0577) 
Post-3 years -0.132* -0.0234 -0.0395 
 (0.0684) (0.0721) (0.0524) 
Post-4 years -0.149* -0.0339 -0.0333 
 (0.0853) (0.0910) (0.0626) 
Post-5+ years -0.0939 0.0160 -0.0237 
 (0.0699) (0.0637) (0.0501) 
    
Observations 120,792 120,792 120,792 
R-squared 0.974 0.977 0.981 
F-tests (p-value)    
Pre-ordinance enactment 0.690 0.147 0.000 
Post-ordinance enactment 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
County trends No Yes No 
County*year fixed effects No No Yes 
    
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The independent variables are indicators of the number of years since a nuisance ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality relative to the year the dependent variable was recorded in that municipality. “Reported crimes” is 
defined as the sum of homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, 
and arson. Zero years since nuisance ordinance enactment is the omitted time period, which also includes 
municipalities that never enacted an ordinance. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects.  
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TABLE A7: Effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on male mortality from assault 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total male deaths by assault, not at home 
       
Post-ordinance -2.928 -2.481 -2.477 -2.805 -2.436 -2.442 
 (3.337) (3.251) (3.448) (3.263) (3.338) (3.379) 
       
Observations 85,158 85,158 85,158 84,823 84,823 84,823 
R-squared 0.767 0.774 0.778 0.770 0.777 0.782 
       
State trends No Yes No No Yes No 
State*year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
County controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: “Post-ordinance” is an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after an ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality within a county. County controls include the proportion of a county’s total population that is male, the 
proportion of a county’s total population that is Black, and the proportion of a county’s total population that is 













TABLE A8: Effect of nuisance ordinance enactment on Google Trends search topics related to 
domestic violence 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PANEL A “domestic violence” 
    
Post-ordinance 1.649* 1.092 1.256 
 (0.971) (0.894) (1.195) 
    
Observations 2,704 2,704 2,704 
R-squared 0.819 0.830 0.861 
    
PANEL B “women’s shelter” 
    
Post-ordinance 5.334*** 5.776*** 7.014*** 
 (0.855) (1.248) (1.286) 
    
Observations 2,110 2,110 2,110 
R-squared 0.599 0.631 0.704 
    
PANEL C “eviction” 
    
Post-ordinance 7.276*** 5.617*** 7.301*** 
 (1.237) (1.166) (1.515) 
    
Observations 2,618 2,618 2,618 
R-squared 0.733 0.778 0.818 
    
PANEL D “gender” 
    
Post-ordinance 1.361 0.0343 -0.214 
 (0.897) (0.800) (0.831) 
    
Observations 2,716 2,716 2,716 
R-squared 0.896 0.906 0.924 
    
    
State trends No Yes No 
State*year fixed effects No No Yes 
    
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: “Post-ordinance" is an indicator that the dependent variable was recorded after an ordinance was enacted in a 
municipality within a DMA. All regressions include DMA and year fixed effects. Search index values were averaged 
across five days of data collection; no DMA-years present in less than five days of data were dropped when calculating 
the averages. 
 
